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Abstract
This study quantiﬁes the inequality of opportunity (IOp) for healthy aging in Eu-
rope. Unlike earlier studies, an objective health indicator, grip strength, is used as an
outcome. Using the longitudinal data from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retire-
ment in Europe (Wave 1-5), I introduce a general model where explanatory variables
portray individual lifetime trajectory. All predictors are disentangled into illegitimate
and legitimate components. The Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator is employed to deal
with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of time-variant lifestyle.
Both upper and lower bounds of IOp are considered by incorporating diﬀerent sets of
illegitimate factors under six scenarios. Parallel results based on self-reported health
are provided. We ﬁnd that IOp in a subjective measure is less sensitive to age, but more
to unobserved factors. Finally, the magnitude of IOp is compared between men and
women as well as across ten statesDenmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy. Overall, the results are sensitive
to the choice in health indicator.
Keyword: healthy aging, inequality of opportunity, direct unfairness, fairness gap
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1 Introduction
This study quantiﬁes the inequality of opportunity (IOp) for health among heterogeneous
groups of the elderly population in Europe. Our goal is to disentangle ethically unaccept-
able inequality from the overall disparity. Therefore, all predictors are classiﬁed as either
an illegitimate or legitimate factor, which is coined as circumstance (C) and eﬀort (E)
respectively. Broadly speaking, the distinction between two components is often made ac-
cording to individual responsibility (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). In this study, we
introduce a general model that incorporates various determinants of health, which sketch
individual lifetime trajectories from childhood to late adulthood. Various distinctions be-
tween C and E are considered under six scenarios.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, I use an objective indicator of health as
an outcome instead of self-reported health, which has been widely used in earlier studies on
a similar subject (e.g. Bricard et al., 2013). A subjective indicator might be incomparable
across heterogeneous groups due to their diﬀerent thresholds or rating scales. For example,
Jürges (2007) shows that the Danish and Swedish are more optimistic about own health,
and Germans are less so compared to other European counterparts. Bago d'Uva et al.
(2011) also ﬁnd that highly educated people tend to assess their health more negatively.
I attempt to deal with the issue of reporting heterogeneity by introducing an objective
measure, grip strength, as a primary dependent variable. In addition, self-reported health
is also used as a secondary variable for comparison.
Secondly, while most existing studies focus on the lower bound of IOp, this paper also
addresses its upper bound by taking unobserved individual heterogeneity into account.
In earlier investigation, partial observability of circumstance/eﬀort and the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity were often neglected. Omitted variables may contain not only
unmeasured circumstance and eﬀort, but also luck-related components. By excluding these
factors from computation, we always obtain the lower bound of IOp. In addition, without
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we encounter a problem of endogeneity regarding
some key variables, which is lifestyle in our case. To deal with these issues, I apply a panel
data technique to gauge the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity to health disparity
rather explicitly. More speciﬁcally, the Hausman-Taylor (1981)'s approach is applied on
the random eﬀect model, which also allows for the estimation of coeﬃcients of endogenous
time-varying and invariant factors consistently by letting other exogenous regressors (or
their deviations from the mean) serve as instrument variables (IV).
2
In many empirical studies on IOp, childhood backgrounds are often considered the
most illegitimate determinant for adulthood outcomes. The Survey of Health, Aging and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) provides an adequate source of data for this purpose.
While exclusively targeting people above age 50, its third wave is uniquely designed for
surveying respondents' childhood retrospectively. There are ﬁve waves that are available to
date. Our model uses lagged values for lifestyle variables as covariates to avoid the problem
of reverse causality. As a result, I consider the outcome variables from Wave 2, 4 and
5 and analyze ten countries that appear through Wave 1-5. Our sample contains 21,530
observations which are collected from Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy.
As mentioned above, I impose various normative positions regarding the scope of indi-
vidual responsibility in terms of late adulthood health. To quantify the upper bound of IOp,
if both time-varying and invariant unobserved heterogeneities are classiﬁed as illegitimate
factors, C, the unfair inequality takes on more than 90% of the overall inequality unless age
is standardized. That is, young adulthood outcomes (including education and occupational
status) and late adulthood lifestyle seem to play a limited role in equalizing the distribution
of health. Even when all variance due to unobserved factors is standardized, however, we
still observe 10-40% of IOp in grip strength, which is attributed to demographic characteris-
tics and childhood backgrounds. When self-reported health is used instead, this magnitude
falls to 5-25%. These results indicate the lower bound of IOp.
Furthermore, our results suggest that age-related variation is slightly larger in grip
strength, especially among men relative to women. On the other hand, the variation driven
by unobserved heterogeneity is more pronounced in self-assessed health, especially among
women relative to men. Fixing time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at zero, two indica-
tors consistently suggest that elderly people in France, Belgium and Germany face relatively
high IOp in health, while their counterparts in Denmark enjoy low IOp. Nonetheless, we
ﬁnd little consistency in other cases, which sometimes conﬂict between indicators. This
study demonstrates the importance of a careful choice in outcome indicator as well as a
normative position when measuring IOp in health status.
2 Data
SHARE is the European longitudinal study on the population over 50 years old. SHARE
provides detailed information about individuals' socioeconomic status, human capital, fam-
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ily, health, lifestyles, social networks, beliefs/values, etc. The initial survey was launched
in eleven European countries and Israel in 2004. New waves have been added every two
years. To date, ﬁve waves have been released, where eight countries additionally joined.
The third sweep (SHARE LIFE) was specially added to investigate respondents' childhood
and young adulthood situations retrospectively. The data also contains a small fraction
of participants' younger partners. We consider only the observations over age 50 in each
sweep.
I construct panel data consisting of three periods (t = 1, 2, 3). The structure is illus-
trated in Table 1. Time-invariant variables (i.e. adulthood height, education, etc.) are
mainly collected from Wave 1. If they are missing, I refer to the corresponding variables
in following waves. Information on childhood backgrounds is retrieved from Wave 3, or
from a mini childhood module in Wave 5. The data also contains lagged lifestyle variables
retrieved from the previous wave to rule out reverse causality. Accordingly, our analysis is
restricted to ten countries that participated in all waves, such as Denmark (DK), Sweden
(SE), Switzerland (CH), Austria (AT), Germany (DE), France (FR), the Netherlands (NL),
Belgium (BE), Spain (ES), and Italy (IT).
Table 1: Structure of the data used in the analysis
Year t Used information Retrieved Information Observations
Wave 1 2004/2005 (dropped)
Wave 2 2006/2007 1 health status adulthood height from w1,
childhood from w3 & 5, job
at age 35 from w3, lifestyle
from w1
7,418
Wave 3 2008/2009 (dropped)
Wave 4 2011/12 2 health status adulthood height from w1,
childhood from w3 & 5, job
at age 35 from w3, lifestyle
from w2
7,170
Wave 5 2013 3 health status adulthood height from w1,
childhood from w3, job at age
35 from w3, lifestyle from w4
6,942
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2.1 Dependent Variable
Compared to other European surveys such as the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC),
SHARE provides the widest range of health indicators. O'Donnell (2009) enumerates avail-
able variables in SHARE from subjective to objective measures: self-assessed health, chronic
condition, activity limitations, health-related symptoms, depression scale, diagnosed cond-
tions, body mass index, physical measurements (e.g. grip strength and walking speed), and
mortality. First, I choose a relatively objective indicator as a dependent variable to assure
international and interpersonal comparability. Mortality is left out because the cause-of-
death is unknown for some cases. Accordingly, I consider physical performance test scores.
I choose maximum grip strength instead of walking speed due to a large number of missing
cases in the latter.
Abundant evidence suggests that hand grip is a valid predictor for overall health out-
comes. For example, Bohannon (2008) ﬁnds 24 articles that investigate its association with
mortality/survival, 9 articles with disability, and 12 articles with complications and/or in-
creased length of hospitalization. Most studies he reviews focus on older subjects. There
are additional ﬁndings proving the correlation between hand grip and the risk of diabetes
(Wander et al., 2011) and dementia/Alzheimer (Boyle et al., 2009). Furthermore, even
compared to chronological age, grip strength is found to be a more useful single marker of
frailty for older people (Syddall et al., 2003)1.
Second, concerning the fact that grip strength might be a narrow measure, self-rated
global health is considered as another dependent variable. To make results more comparable
between indicators as well as across countries, the ordinal variable is converted into a
continuous one with the same scale as grip strength (1 to 100) after being regressed on
other sub-indicators of health. I consider that this procedure helps reduce country-speciﬁc
reporting heterogeneity, which is hinted by dissimilar distributions of the original variable
in Appendix A.
The detailed procedure is as follows. The original ﬁve categories of self-assessed health
are dichotomized to 0 for fair/poor health and 1 for excellent/very good/good health. This
binary variable is regressed on a set of other self-reported indicators which focus on more
details of physical condition, such as limitations with general/instrumental/daily activities
1They compared hand grip and chronological age in terms of predicting decreased cognitive function,
increased lens opacity, higher hearing threshold, poorer visual acuity, lower hemoglobin, higher alkaline
phosphatase, fewer teeth, increased risk of walking problems, self-reported generalized arthritis and fracture.
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(0 none, 1 more than one), chronic condition (0 none or one, 1 more than two), mobility
limitations (scale between 0 and 10), long-term illness (0 none, 1 yes), and body mass index
(1 underweight, 2 normal, 3 overweight, 4 obese). Using probit estimation, I compute a
predicted probability of each individual reporting good health status, and multiply these
values by 100. This transformation is conducted based on a pooled sample. An alternative
method based on separate samples from each country is also applied, which is used for
sensitivity analysis in Section 6.
Figure 1 illustrates that the distribution of grip strength substantially diﬀers between
men and women. This picture suggests that grip strength may be useful for comparing
health status across population groups that are unlikely to diverge from each other biologi-
cally (e.g. country, education, etc.), but not based on other factors (e.g. gender, etc.). The
gender diﬀerence is less pronounced in terms of self-assessed health. Overall, we observe
higher dispersion of grip strength among males. Considering a large discrepancy in the
distribution between gender as well as indicators, I analyze the samples of men and women
separately and quantify IOp as a proportion of the illegitimate inequality in the overall
disparity of each indicator.
6
Figure 1: Distribution of health status
(a) Grip strength
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(b) Self-reported health
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2.2 Independent Variables
Our explanatory variables embody four life cycle stageschildhood, adolescence, early
adulthood, and late adulthood. Our childhood-related covariates are the number of books at
age ten and parental lifestyles such as drinking and smoking. The former is used as a proxy
variable of socioeconomic status during childhood. Wickrama et al. (1999) demonstrate
that family social status and lifestyles are important channels for the inter-generational
transmission of health. We also include childhood residential area to control for regional
gaps in the delivery of health care, neighborhood eﬀect, environmental risk (i.e. pollutant),
and so on.
As an adolescent factor, we include adult height2 as a proxy for health investment during
childhood (Case and Paxson, 2008). Considering gradual improvement of nutritional status
2This information is surveyed only in the ﬁrst wave that each respondent joined.
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among younger generations, height is transformed as deciles within age groups3, gender and
country. In addition, our model portrays early adulthood SES by educational attainment
(e.g. years of schooling) and initial occupation at age 35.
While it is straightforward that childhood characteristics are considered illegitimate fac-
tors, it is less clear whether the inﬂuence of young adulthood outcomes can be legitimate
or not. For example, at a glance, adult height seems to have nothing to do with individual
responsibility, because it is an indicator of childhood living conditions as well as genetic
endowment (Silventoinen, 2003). Nonetheless, recent evidence shows that lifestyle also con-
tributes to height shrinkage in the aging process (Huang et al., 2013). Similarly, children's
educational and occupational choices are aﬀected by their own aspirations and endeavors
in addition to parental support or inherited gifts (Diris and Ooghe, 2015). In a nutshell,
these variables have two-sided features that are simultaneously related to illegitimate and
legitimate factors. For notational simplicity, I name them mixed variables (M).
I attempt to disentangle C and E compounded in M . Following Roemer (1998)'s view,
I deem that any correlation between two factors in M is considered to be illegitimate (C)
(Trannoy et al., 2010). Accordingly, a residual approach is employed to purge the inﬂuence
of childhood inM . To elaborate further, I regressesM on childhood background and obtain
its residuals. We apply OLS regression for continuous variables such as adult height and
years of schooling. For a categorical variable, the initial occupational status, we operate
the ordered probit regression and compute generalized residuals (Gourieroux et al., 1987).
Finally, late adulthood characteristics are captured by lifestyles such as smoking, drink-
ing, exercising, and a high level of cholesterol diagnosed by a medical doctor. The last
factor is assumed to partially inform about dietary habit. As mentioned earlier, its lagged
value is used, considering reverse causation between lifestyle and health.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics of all variables are provided in Appendix B. On average, Spain
and Italy show lower maximum grip strength as well as lower self-reported health. The
standard deviation of grip strength is relatively high in Denmark, as well as that of self-
reported health in Spain and Italy. The mean age is around 67 years old, but samples
from Austria, Sweden and Spain are one or two years older. The proportion of females
is about 55% in all samples, on average, yet it diverges slightly in Danish and Austrian
3Age is divided into 7 groups such as 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79 and 80-102.
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samples. Between-country variation is more pronounced in terms of the number of books
during childhood. While 26% of the Swedish sample had books that were enough to ﬁll
two shelves, this was only 4-6% for Spanish and Italian samples. In all samples, more than
half had a smoking parent. Nonetheless, the prevalence of parental smoking is even higher
than 70% in Danish, Belgian, and Dutch samples. Less than 15% had a heavily drinking
parent, which is relatively consistent across countries, except for the Dutch sample that
records only 4%.
Concerning adolescent and young adulthood characteristics, we observe a clear diver-
gence in southern Europe. For example, the average years of schooling are much lower in
Spain and Italy. Moreover, the proportion of non-manual job holderssuch as profession-
als, technicians, and service employees/oﬃce clerksis lower, and that of the inactive or
unemployed population is relatively higher in these countries.
Drinking and smoking behavior somehow reﬂects social and cultural norms present in
the society. In all samples, around 20% of respondents smoke. We observe a slightly higher
smoking rate in Denmark. In southern Europe, nearly half of respondents are alcohol
abstainers. The rate of daily drinking is approximately 40% in Italy and France, and 30%
in the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and Belgium. We ﬁnd more physically inactive
elderly people in Spain and Italy, which is around 10-15%. The incidence of high cholesterol
is higher in Spain and Belgium (30-34%) compared to other countries.
3 Method
Partial observability of individual characteristics and the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity are commonly addressed challenges in empirical investigations of equality of op-
portunity. Using limited information provided by survey-based data, many studies focus
on the correlation between observed circumstances (or eﬀort) and the outcome of interest
(See Lefranc et al., 2009; Rosa Dias, 2010 for further discussions), resulting in the lower
bound of IOp. Endogeneity of a variable is another concern related to unobserved hetero-
geneity. For instance, if lifestyle is endogenous to past illness and/or sudden shocks that
are not surveyed, we hardly identify independent contribution of individual eﬀort to health
maintenance (See García-Gómez et al., 2015).
To overcome these shortcomings, this study employs a panel data technique, namely the
Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator based on the random eﬀect model, in order to identify not
only a causal eﬀect of past lifestyle but also the role of unobserved heterogeneity explicitly.
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Note that a linear model is applicable to both indicators of health, which range between 1
and 100.
3.1 Estimation strategy
We consider the following base model with Zi and Xit, denoting vectors of time-invariant
and variant variables respectively. We are concerned with the situation where Cov(Xit, ui) 6=
0, or endogenous lifestyle in other words.
yit = α+ β1Zi + γXit + ui + eit (1)
Although we can obtain consistent estimates of γ through the ﬁxed eﬀect model, time-
invariant factors such as Zi are removed by within-transformation; hence, β is not estimable.
Therefore, I adopt the Hausman-Taylor (1981)'s approach (HT) which involves the following
steps.
First, we sub-divide Xit into exogenous and endogenous factors, denoted as X1it and
X2it respectively.
yit = α+ βZi + γ1X1it + γ2X2it + ui + eit (2)
As a result, our model considers three groups of variables as follows.
• Zi: A vector of time-invariant variables that are considered to be uncorrelated with
ui (e.g. childhood condition, mixed factors)
• X1it: A vector of time-varying variables that are uncorrelated with ui (e.g. current
age)
• X2it: A vector of time-varying variables that are correlated with ui (e.g. lifestyle)
Through a within-transformation (eq. 3), we obtain consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients
of all time-varying factors, namely γ1 and γ2. In addition, the variance of the residuals, σ
2
e ,
is also consistently estimated using the residuals from this stage.
(yit − yi) = γ1(X1it − X¯1i) + γ2(X2it − X¯2i) + (eit − ei) (3)
where yi =
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
yit, xJi =
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
xJit(J = 1, 2) and ei =
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
eit.
10
Using γˆ1 and γˆ2 estimated from the ﬁrst stage, we get the group-mean of the residuals,
ε¯i (eq. 4).
εi = yi − γˆ1X¯1i − γˆ2X¯2i (4)
Next, we regress ε¯i on Zi. If Zi is endogenous, Hausman and Taylor (1981) propose to
use X¯1it and other exogenous time-invariant variables as IV. In our case, all time-invariant
factors are assumed to be exogenous; hence, Zi is used as IV for itself in eq. (5).
ε¯i = βZi + ui + ei (5)
The variance of the total residuals in eq. (5), σ∗2, can be re-expressed in eq. (6).
σ∗2 = σ2u +
σ2e
Ti
(6)
By using σ2e , which is computed in eq. (3), we can estimate σ
2
u via eq. (7).
σ2u = σ
∗2 − σ
2
e
Ti
(7)
Finally, we compute θi, the coeﬃcient to be used for GLS transformation (eq. 9), and get
β, γ1 and γ2.
θi = 1− σu√
σ2e + Tiσ
2
u
(8)
yit − θiyi = α(1− θi) + βZi(1− θi) + γ1(X1it − θiX¯1it) + γ2(X2it − θiX¯2it) (9)
+ui(1− θi) + (eit − θiei) (10)
In Appendix C, I compare γˆ2 obtained from various estimating methods such as ﬁxed
eﬀect (FE), random eﬀect (RE), and a pooled OLS (OLS) estimation. In addition, the
correlated random eﬀect model with Mundlak-speciﬁcation (ML) is also considered, which
assumes eq. (11) and transform the model to eq. (12).
ui = η2X2it + i (11)
yit = α+ βZi + γ1X1it + γ2X2it + η2X2it + i + eit (12)
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Overall, the statistical importance of γˆ2 is either absent or weak across all speciﬁcations.
In terms of economic importance, γˆ2 obtained from HT is similar to that of FE and ML,
but substantially diﬀerent from that of RE or OLS. Although an ML approach can be used
alternatively, HT is still preferred because it does not require additional regressors such as
X1it and X2it, making our model more parsimonious
4. However, we still use the results
from ML for robustness check in Section G.
3.2 Responsibility cut
After estimating all coeﬃcients, all predictors are partitioned into two components, C
and E, where C is a vector of (illegitimate) circumstance variables, and E is a vector of
(legitimate) eﬀort variables. The borderline between the two is coined a responsibility
cut, whose location depends on a researcher's normative judgment. I consider six possible
scenarios (Table 2).
Under Scenario I, individual responsibility is deﬁned as what is fully controlled by an
individual (e.g. control approach). Under this position, only late adulthood lifestyle can
be considered as E. Nevertheless, one may argue that individuals decide their health-
promoting behavior based on given constraints (i.e. time, economic resource, environment,
etc.). It is also empirically proven that lifestyles are signiﬁcantly correlated with individual
socioeconomic status (SES) (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004; Balia and Jones, 2008; Govil
et al., 2009; Paulik et al., 2010). Nevertheless, our model posits that past lifestyles are
time-varying factors, where people are free to choose whether to maintain or adjust in each
period. Furthermore, using the Hausman-Taylor estimator, we restrict lifestyle to explain
the within-individual variation of health status only, which equally applies to all individuals
regardless of their heterogeneous backgrounds.
Under Scenario II, I postulate that individuals are responsible for their actions after the
age of consent (Roemer and Trannoy, 2013). Accordingly, residuals of M are additionally
classiﬁed as E. The next scenario III relates ethical concern regarding demographic dis-
parity. Although aging is inescapable and thus beyond individual control, one may argue
that its inﬂuence on physical strength is rather biological, and hence not to be ethically
illegitimate. In this view, age can be sorted as E instead.
4In our study, it is assumed that individuals are fully responsible for the consequence of their lifestyle, as
far as the eﬀect is independent of any kind of individual characteristics including unobserved heterogeneity
(See Section 3.2). Therefore, our normative position is incompatible with ML speciﬁcation, which assumes
individual mean lifestyle, X2it, to be correlated with individual random eﬀects.
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The following scenarios are motivated to grasp the importance of unobserved hetero-
geneity. However, it is diﬃcult to classify unobserved terms into either factor without
a strong assumption. For instance, a time-invariant heterogeneity, ui, may indicate ge-
netic endowment and environmental factors that have a latent eﬀect on health. Using
this interpretation, ui can be considered as C. Nevertheless, ui also conveys unmeasured
health-related preferences, which suggests its classiﬁcation as E.
Concerning eit, idiosyncratic shocks, more explicit interpretation is possible by intro-
ducing an additional factor, luck (L), in addition to C and E. That is, disparity in an
outcome due to eit is ethically unacceptable if we assume that it represents brute luck.
It relates to the event that an individual has no reasonable inﬂuence on a probability of
its occurrence. On the other hand, it can be legitimated if eit is viewed as option luck.
It requires other conditions such as the risk is taken deliberately, is calculated, isolated,
anticipated and avoidable (Dworkin, 1981, retrieved from Vallentyne, 2002 and Lefranc et
al., 2009).
Instead of interpreting these factors arbitrarily, we consider all possible scenarios de-
pending on the identiﬁcation of each. Scenario IV classiﬁes ui as an illegitimate factor and
eit as a legitimate one. Scenario V does vice versa. In the ﬁnal scenario, all unobserved
factors are considered to be legitimate factors.
Table 2: Responsibility cut according to various scenarios
Scenario Illegitimate Legitimate Note
I age, childhood, M , ui, eit lifestyle Upper bound of IOp
II age, childhood, ui, eit M , lifestyle
III childhood, ui, eit age, M , lifestyle
IV age, childhood, ui eit, M , lifestyle
V age, childhood, eit ui, M , lifestyle
VI age, childhood ui, eit, M , lifestyle Lower bound of IOp
3.3 Standardization
I use Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009)'s framework of direct and indirect standardization
to quantify the illegitimate inequality in health. The direct standardization produces di-
rect unfairness by ﬁxing all individuals' eﬀort variables at reference values: y∗(C,E∗). The
DU satisﬁes the reward principle, which states that diﬀerences in outcome due to eﬀorts
are equitable; hence better eﬀort should be rewarded. However, under the artiﬁcial situa-
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tion where everyone makes the same eﬀort, there is no inﬂuence of legitimate diﬀerence.
Therefore, any health disparities after the direct standardization are considered illegitimate.
On the other hand, the indirect standardization computes the fairness gap (FG). It
refers to the diﬀerence between a health status that is predicted by actual variables and a
hypothetical counterpart that assumes identical circumstances for all individuals: y(C,E)−
y∗(C∗, E). The FG satisﬁes the compensation principle, which means that the health status
of two individuals making the same eﬀorts should be equal, since a fair society compensates
the worse-oﬀ between them.
The detailed procedure for commutating DU and FG under each scenario is displayed
in Appendix D using the following values as references.
• Childhood: having the largest number of books, no parental smoking or heavy drink-
ing, and having lived in town
• Age: being aged 50
• M : zero for residualized height, zero for residualized occupational choices, three for
residualized years of schooling (roughly leading to one level higher educational degree)
• Lifestyle: drinking monthly, non smoking, exercising, and absence of high cholesterol
• ui and eit: zero
In general, the principles of reward and compensation are incompatible when the eﬀects
of eﬀorts and circumstances are not independent of one another. Accordingly, none of the
direct and indirect methods satisfy both principles simultaneously. However, within an
additively separable model, which is our case, two methods yield the same outcome. This
fact provides another rationale for our approach that converts an ordinal variable of self-
reported health into a continuous indicator and applies a linear model. Consequently, our
measures of IOp using DU and FG are equivalent to each other as expressed in eq. (13).
IOp(%) =
V ar(DU)
V ar(yit)
× 100 = V ar(FG)
V ar(yit)
× 100 (13)
4 Estimation results
This section provides an overview on the relationship between each of the regressors and
two indicators of health based on a pooled analysis (Table 3). However, in the next section,
IOp is computed based on the estimation using country-speciﬁc samples. The results are
presented in Appendix E. In terms of the sign of coeﬃcients, the results between pooled
and separate analyses are mostly consistent.
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All results are presented according to the timing of events in one's life course. The
ﬁrst set of variables portrays childhood backgrounds. Childhood SES is positively corre-
lated with both indicators, which is proxied by the number of books at age ten. On the
other hand, parental lifestyle plays a diﬀerent role in explaining each indicator. For males,
parental smoking is insigniﬁcantly correlated with both indicators of health. For females, it
is positively correlated with women's grip strength, but negatively with their self-reported
health. However, the statistical signiﬁcance of such correlations is weak (P < 0.1). Relative
to smoking, parental alcohol consumption is more closely related to a descendent's health
status in late adulthood. If a parent was a heavy drinker, the probability of reporting good
health is likely to decrease by 4.43 percentage points for sons and 6.06 percentage points for
daughters. On the other hand, its correlation with children's grip strength is statistically
insigniﬁcant.
Although a positive contribution from parental smoking is counter-intuitive, I attempt
to provide some possible explanations. First of all, it could simply be attributed to im-
precise measurement. In SHARE data, most of the childhood information relies on elderly
participants' retrospect; hence, it is hard to account for detailed features (i.e. frequency or
amount) of parental smoking behavior. Moreover, during their parents' young adulthood,
cigarette smoking began to spread widely, especially at the outbreak of the World Wars,
yet the public awareness of its hazards was not well established. As a consequence, tobacco
usage can misrepresent parental health practice if it merely signals a temporary attempt to
follow a fashion of that time.
In addition, we should not neglect the fact that the social gradient on tobacco consump-
tion has varied over time. A number of studies claim that cigarette smoking was initially
adopted by people in a privileged position who were more opt to or able to accept innovative
lifestyles. When such upstream practice was diﬀused to other segments of society, however,
the high status initiators began to turn away from smoking. The reason is that, by this
period, health concern emerged as a more innovative idea in life (Ferrence, 1989; Pettit
and Griswold, 1995 retrieved from Pampel, 2005; Escobedo and Peddicord, 1996; Graham,
1996). To conclude, if smoking status misinforms about parental unhealthy behavior, or its
correlation with other unobserved factors (i.e. social status) plays a greater role, it is not
striking to observe such a result that is in discord with our conventional belief.
The diﬀerent roles of parental lifestyle regarding objective and subjective indicators can
be partly attributed to reporting bias. Supporting this hypothesis, Bertoni (2015) docu-
ments the long-term impact of childhood deprivation on individual perception of subjective
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well-being. The author reports that childhood starvation tends to lower standards of life
satisfaction later in life. In our case, the inﬂuence of parental risky behavior seems to be
opposite, if it exists, which induces children to use higher thresholds in their diagnosis of
overall health, and thus report a worse condition. One of the possible relevant mechanisms
is exposure to parental disease (e.g. cancer) which could have been directly or indirectly
caused by their unhealthy behavior. While facing an adverse situation followed by parental
illness, children may have not only learned the cost of risky lifestyles but could have also
been motivated to adjust their expectations about health. In addition, it is also plausible
that self-assessment reﬂects a broader aspect of overall health compared to grip strength,
which helps reveal further association with parental behavior.
Compared to those who lived in an urban area during childhood, people who lived
either in a town or a rural area tend to show higher grip strength. However, for males,
childhood residence does not play a role in determining subjective health. Next, we consider
a number of outcomes that are attained shortly after the age of consent, namely height, as a
proxy for initial health, education, and occupation during young adulthood. In most cases,
adulthood height and education are positively correlated with better health. In addition,
from the male sample only, we ﬁnd a negative correlation between higher tendency to hold
a manual job and both health indicators. On the other hand, presumably due to women's
low participation in the labor market, this variable has minimal predictive power regarding
women's health.
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Table 3: Estimation result: pooled sample across ten countries
Male Female
Grip strength SRH Grip strength SRH
Book at age 10 (ref. few)
: One shelf 1.59*** (0.32) 0.94 (1.00) 0.87*** (0.21) 4.97*** (1.05)
: One bookcase 1.67*** (0.33) 2.88** (1.03) 0.66** (0.22) 6.23*** (1.09)
: Two bookcases 1.35*** (0.39) 2.35+ (1.20) 1.11*** (0.26) 5.72*** (1.28)
Parent smoked 0.22 (0.26) -0.38 (0.79) 0.29+ (0.16) -1.57+ (0.82)
Parent drank heavily -0.26 (0.44) -4.43** (1.36) -0.41 (0.27) -6.06*** (1.33)
Childhood residence (vs. City)
: Town 1.16*** (0.32) -1.06 (1.00) 0.39+ (0.22) 2.45* (1.09)
: Rural area 1.73*** (0.32) -0.85 (0.99) 1.09*** (0.22) 3.38** (1.07)
Height decile_residuals 1.99*** (0.12) 0.99** (0.37) 1.33*** (0.08) 0.29 (0.38)
Education_residuals 0.03 (0.03) 0.63*** (0.11) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.72*** (0.12)
Job at age 35_residuals -0.28* (0.12) -1.60*** (0.38) -0.12 (0.08) -0.60 (0.40)
Drank at t− 1 (ref. Daily)
: Weekly -0.01 (0.19) -0.19 (0.64) -0.25 (0.16) 0.90 (0.77)
: Monthly 0.04 (0.26) -0.34 (0.87) -0.16 (0.18) -0.02 (0.88)
: Never 0.01 (0.28) -0.18 (0.94) 0.01 (0.19) -0.52 (0.91)
Smoked at t− 1 0.20 (0.27) 0.82 (0.92) 0.03 (0.23) 1.28 (1.08)
Exercised weekly at t− 1 0.15 (0.22) 0.75 (0.73) 0.25+ (0.14) 0.04 (0.65)
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 0.08 (0.19) 1.28* (0.62) 0.08 (0.13) 0.58 (0.63)
Country (ref. Switzerland)
: Austria 3.53*** (0.75) -11.93*** (2.31) 2.07*** (0.47) -8.81*** (2.35)
: Germany 3.10*** (0.67) -13.97*** (2.07) 1.56*** (0.45) -11.96*** (2.23)
: Sweden 3.88*** (0.64) -6.08** (1.97) 1.57*** (0.42) -7.42*** (2.06)
: Netherlands 2.38*** (0.64) -5.62** (1.97) 1.17** (0.42) -6.66** (2.09)
: Spain -4.14*** (0.68) -10.70*** (2.10) -3.43*** (0.46) -14.47*** (2.26)
: Italy -0.45 (0.64) -8.06*** (1.97) -1.58*** (0.42) -10.19*** (2.11)
: France 0.83 (0.65) -9.92*** (2.00) -0.43 (0.42) -7.55*** (2.11)
: Denmark 3.45*** (0.65) -5.70** (2.01) 0.67 (0.44) -5.59** (2.17)
: Belgium 2.31*** (0.59) -8.98*** (1.82) 0.38 (0.39) -9.64*** (1.95)
Age -0.55*** (0.01) -0.80*** (0.04) -0.31*** (0.01) -0.81*** (0.04)
σu 6.25 19.11 4.51 22.57
σe 4.46 15.04 3.39 16.12
N 9,760 11,770
Note: Constant terms are omitted. Standard errors are in parentheses. (+ p< 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < 0.001)
The following variables provide insights into the health-related lifestyle of late adult-
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hood. Exercising helps increase women's physical strength, which is measured objectively.
Unexpectedly, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between high cholesterol and males' self-
reported health only. It may be partly attributed to reporting heterogeneity unless two
measures capture diﬀerent aspects of health condition. That is, those who exert a less
healthy lifestyle that leads to a high level of cholesterol may be more optimistic when
rating own health status5.
Dummies for country of residence are introduced next to control for the country-ﬁxed
eﬀect. The diﬀerent signs of their coeﬃcients between two indicators suggest the presence
of country-speciﬁc reporting heterogeneity. Compared to Switzerland, for instance, people
from most countries tend to perceive their health less optimistically, even if their physical
strength is similar or higher, except for Spain and Italy. The chronological age follows
next, which provides indications of biological deterioration of health due to aging. We
ﬁnd a slightly larger health penalty of aging among men. On the other hand, the gender
discrepancy in aging is less pronounced concerning self-assessed health. The ﬁnal two rows
show the standard deviations of residuals, ui and eit. Both σu and σe are larger for self-
assessed health. This result is plausible because error terms include (unobserved) reporting
bias.
5 Comparison of Inequality of opportunity (IOp)
5.1 Across normative positions
In this section, we compare the magnitude of IOp across diﬀerent normative positions as
well as measures of health status. Let us begin the discussion with the case of males
presented in Figure 2. As mentioned in Section 3.3, IOp is measured in a relative term,
namely its proportion to the overall inequality. Based on an objective measure for health,
as presented in Figure 2(a), IOp takes up almost 100% when only the lifestyle-related
inequality is considered to be legitimate (Scenario I). Even if we consider that the disparity
explained by intermediate adulthood outcomes (including SES) is also legitimate, a decrease
5In country-speciﬁc analyses (Appendix C), we observe a substantial variation in health returns to
drinking behavior across countries. In Germany (among females), the Netherlands, and Belgium (among
females), less frequent drinking negatively aﬀects physical health. On the other hand, a positive role is found
in Sweden (among males), Italy (among females) and Switzerland (among females). To some extent, this
divergence can be attributed to cultural or societal backgrounds that determine preferred type of alcohol,
drinking context or amount, and so on. For instance, in some societies, non-frequent drinking behavior may
reﬂect limited social interactions, which can aggravate physical health (Cornwell and Waite, 2009).
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of IOp in Scenario II is less than 5 percentage points in most cases. However, a visible drop
(by 5-15 percentage points) is found in Scenario III, where age diﬀerence is additionally
standardized. This change captures the contribution of biological aging to the inequality
in health. Under this scenario, IOp in grip strength is still higher than 80%.
A further drop is observed in Scenario IV that standardizes an idiosyncratic shock,
eit, which is deﬁned as option luck. Compared to that in the ﬁrst two scenarios, IOp
in grip strength decreases by more than 30 percentage points in most countries except
for the Netherlands, France, Denmark, and Belgium. Under Scenario V that presumes
ui to mostly reﬂect unobserved eﬀorts, we ﬁnd that its contribution to IOp outweighs
that of eit in most cases. Germany is an exception, where time-variant and invariant
unobserved heterogeneities are equivalently important for a disparity in (objective) health
of the elderly population. In Scenario VI, when both types of unobserved factors are
considered as legitimate components, the magnitude IOp falls to around 30% or below
in most countries except for France (about 45%). The lowest IOp is found in Italy and
Denmark, which amounts to 20%.
When a subjective measure is used (Figure 2b), the picture changes drastically from
Scenario III onwards. We ﬁnd a smaller contribution of age-related heterogeneity to IOp6.
The results from Scenario IV-V suggest a larger importance of unobserved factors to self-
assessed health. When either term is identiﬁed as an legitimate factor, IOp falls below
50% in most cases except for Germany, France, Denmark and Belgium. Under Scenario
VI, which suggests the lower bound of IOp, less than 15% of inequality is considered to be
unfair in most countries except for Germany and France.
6This result seems contrary to earlier results in Table 3, which shows larger coeﬃcients of age with
respect to self-rated health. Nonetheless, what is compared in this section is the contribution of age to the
overall variance of each indicator expressed in a relative term, rather than its absolute importance to the
mean.
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Figure 2: Inequality of opportunity for health among males (%)
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5.2 Between gender
The results are compared between gender in this section. The parallel results from the
female sample are provided in Appendix F. The overall picture is mostly consistent with
the result from their male counterparts. For an easier comparison, Figure 3 highlights the
gender gap in terms of IOp by subtracting the IOp of females from that of males under
each scenario.
While there is a minimal diﬀerence between gender under the ﬁrst two scenarios, some
visible discrepancies appear from the third scenario onwards. Under Scenario III, for ex-
ample, women show a slightly higher IOp (5 percentage points). Except for France and
Switzerland, however, the gender gap is less pronounced in terms of a subjective indica-
tor. Under Scenario IV, women show a smaller IOp in grip strength, but a larger one in
self-assessed health. Phrasing diﬀerently, eit is more important to females than to males in
terms of objective health, but vice versa in terms of subjective health. The results from Sce-
nario V show that women's IOp is more sensitive to ui regardless of an indicator of health.
The gender gap is largest under the ﬁnal scenario in terms of grip strength. Except for
Switzerland and Belgium, IOp of women's grip strength is around 20% or below (Appendix
F), which is approximately 10 percentage point lower than that of males'. Nonetheless, we
ﬁnd a smaller gender diﬀerence in terms of a subjective indicator under the same scenario.
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Figure 3: Gender diﬀerence in IOp (percentage points)
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Note: ∆ is computed by subtracting the results of females from that of males.
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To summarize, major implications vary with not only normative positions but also
health indicators. Overall, based on an objective measure, the gender gap ranges between
5-20 percentage points. According to Scenario IV-VI, it is suggested that the female elderly
populations enjoy better equality of opportunity for health. Our results imply that women
and men can enjoy an equivalent level of equity in health, if interventions successfully
mitigate the larger role of aging for male populations or that of unobserved heterogeneity
for female counterparts. However, if the diﬀerent roles of these factors are mainly related
to their biological distinction, the gender gap in IOp is unlikely to be closed. Based on a
subjective measure, the gender diﬀerence is less profound.
5.3 Across countries
Finally, the results are also compared across countries. Figures 4-5 exhibit international
ranks of IOp with respect to each of the scenarios and measures. The cross-country com-
parison is conducted based on a weighted mean of IOp of men and women within a country,
which is calculated using each group's sample size. As a reference, IOp obtained from a
pooled sample is added, which is marked as EU7. We can neglect the ﬁrst three scenarios,
of which results suggest an excessive IOp of above 80% in all countries. In this situation,
IOp should be a concern in all societies, and hence comparing relative ranks may not be
useful for policy guidance.
First, let us discuss the results based on grip strength that are assumed to be more
comparable across countries. Under Scenario IV, we ﬁnd the highest IOp in Denmark.
the Netherlands, Belgium and France follow next. Among these countries, Denmark and
the Netherlands switch their relative position substantially under Scenario VI (or V). This
change indicates that their policy makers can eﬀectively lower IOp in health by equalizing
ui. Therefore, particularly in these countries, further investigation considering a wider set
of covariates is needed to reveal what ui actually captures. Except for these countries, plus
Italy, the IOp in most countries remains above 40% under Scenario V, but falls below under
Scenario VI. These results suggest that IOp can be reduced through policies that enable
people to be better insured against their brute luck.
7When computing IOp of EU, the same set of covariates is included without country dummies, equiva-
lently to the case of estimation on individual countries.
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Figure 4: Cross-country comparison of IOp based on grip strength (%)
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Special attention should be given to Belgium and France, which are constantly ranked
relatively high for Scenarios IV-VI, as well as Switzerland, which also exhibits a relatively
high IOp under Scenario VI, the scenario deﬁning circumstances most restrictively. Our
results imply that the link between childhood circumstances and late adulthood health, as
well as between age and late adulthood health, is stronger in these three countries.
Figure 5: Cross-country comparison of IOp based on self-reported health
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When self-reported health is used as an outcome, most results and policy implications
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change substantially, but with a few exceptions (e.g. Denmark, Belgium and France).
For instance, Germany shows high IOp under Scenario IV, which contrasts to the earlier
outcome. On the other hand, the situation in Switzerland under Scenario VI is no longer
as problematic as the earlier results. Again, our results imply the importance of the choice
of an indicator.
In addition, to stress the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity on
IOp, we compare our results with an earlier ﬁnding based on a cross-sectional analysis.
For instance, Bricard et al. (2013) evaluate the IOp in self-reported health using the third
wave of SHARE. They reveal a relatively high importance of circumstances in the Czech
Republic, Greece, France and Austria (70-80%), and a lower importance in Germany, Italy,
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium (about 30-50%), regardless of assumed scenar-
ios8. Precisely speaking, their results are incomparable to any of ours due to the fact that
they measure the relative importance of C to the variation in health explained by observed
characteristics9. However, we assume that our exercise under Scenario VI somewhat resem-
bles their approach in the sense that both concern the lower bound of the IOp. Under this
ﬁnal scenario, similar to their investigation, we ﬁnd a high IOp in France and low IOp in
Switzerland as well as the Netherlands. However, we also obtain some contrasting results
such as a high IOp in Germany and Belgium as well as a middle-ranked IOp for Austria
and Italy.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, additional results are provided to check the robustness of our results. First,
I introduce an alternative subjective indicator that takes country and gender-speciﬁc het-
erogeneities into account. The rational is that the prevalence of some health problems may
diﬀer across populations. For instance, depending on how rare (or common) obesity is in
a society, obese people may perceive their general health diﬀerently. To capture such dif-
ferences, self-reported health status is regressed on the same set of other health indicators,
8They consider two scenarios, namely Roemer (1998)'s scenario that deﬁnes any correlation between C
and E as C, as well as Barry (2005)'s, which does not diﬀerentiate the role of E according to contamination of
C. Their model considers more detailed childhood backgrounds such as the main breadwinner's occupation,
number of books/rooms/facilities, parental lifestyle, economic hardship, experience of hunger, parental
longevity, and regular dental check-ups. Due to missing information, however, many factors are ignored in
this study in order to avoid losing a large number of observations in the longitudinal data. For lifestyle
variables, they retrieve the information from the previous wave.
9On the other hand, we measure the importance of C in the overall variation of health.
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but country and gender-speciﬁc samples are used in prediction instead of a pooled one.
The distribution of our initial and alternative subjective indicators of health diﬀers
(Appendix G). For instance, we ﬁnd higher concentration in the upper end after using an
alternative measure in Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Belgium. An opposite
pattern is observed in Germany (for males), Spain, Italy, and France. Nonetheless, using an
alternative measure does not aﬀect our results substantially as illustrated in Appendix H.
The change is less than 5 percentage points in most cases. The most pronounced diﬀerence
is found under Scenario VI where ui is classiﬁed as an illegitimate factor.
Another robustness check is conducted using a diﬀerent estimation strategy, namely a
random eﬀect model with Mundlak speciﬁcation. Considering the fact that this approach
uses individual average time-varying factors as IV for individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity, mean
values of lifestyle are always classiﬁed in the same group with ui throughout six scenarios.
After using an alternative model speciﬁcation, the change in IOp remains below 5 percentage
points in most cases (Appendix I).
7 Conclusion
This study quantiﬁes unfair health disparities in ten European countriesDenmark, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Italy
 that have participated in SHARE from Wave 1 to 5. Using the framework of equality
of opportunity, I attempt to identify unfairness from the overall disparity in health, by
disentangling all covariates into illegitimate (e.g. circumstance) and legitimate (e.g. eﬀort)
parts. My model incorporates a rich set of explanatory variables that portrays individual
life course, namely childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and late adulthood. By em-
ploying the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimators on the random eﬀect model, we deal with
the issue of endogeneity in lifestyle variables and characterize luck-related components in
unobserved heterogeneity.
The classiﬁcation between illegitimate and legitimate components varies with normative
positions. In this study, six scenarios are considered in order to motivate further ethical
considerations in future policy making processes. In a nutshell, we observe substantially
diﬀerent levels of IOp among the tested scenarios, comprising between 5% to 99% of the
overall inequality. In general, the contribution of young adulthood investment or late
adulthood lifestyle to reducing IOp seems minimal compared to that of time-invariant or
variant heterogeneity.
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In addition, we ﬁnd that overall results change drastically according to the choice in
health indicator. I use grip strength as an objective measure of physical health and (pre-
dicted level of) self-reported health as a subjective one. The impact of aging on IOp is more
pronounced with the former, while IOp in the latter is more sensitive to unobserved factors.
Consequently, under the scenario that assumes the role of unobserved heterogeneity to be
legitimate, we obtain 10-40% of IOp in the former, but 5-25% in the latter.
We also observe some gender-related discrepancies. In terms of grip strength, standard-
izing age diﬀerences leads to a 5 percentage point larger drop of IOp among men. On the
other hand, unobserved heterogeneities seem to be more important channels for mitigating
IOp among women especially in terms of grip strength. Women enjoy up to a 20 percent-
age point better equality of opportunity once unobserved factors are standardized instead.
Nonetheless, the gender gap in IOp is less pronounced when self-reported health is used as
an outcome.
By comparing the results between scenarios, we obtain diﬀerent policy lessons. For ex-
ample, we learn that IOp can be lowered eﬀectively by equalizing unobserved circumstances,
ui, in the Netherlands and Denmark. It is also suggested that IOp can be substantially
reduced by better insuring people against brute luck, eit, in most countries except for the
Netherlands, Denmark and Italy. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a stronger link between childhood
circumstances and late adulthood health, as well as between age and late adulthood health,
in France and Belgium.
In terms of cross-country comparison, we ﬁnd diverging results between two indicators
of health. For example, Switzerland is ranked high for IOp in terms of an objective in-
dicator but low in terms of a subjective one, after standardizing all types of unobserved
heterogeneities. Our results from the latter are compared with Bricard et al. (2013)'s cross-
sectional study based on the third wave of SHARE. Consistently with their ﬁndings, we
observe high IOp in self-assessed health in France and low IOp in Switzerland as well as
the Netherlands. However, we also obtain contrasting results, such as a high level of IOp
in Germany and Belgium. These varying results suggest the importance of unobserved
heterogeneity.
In a nutshell, we ﬁnd not only diﬀerent magnitudes of IOp but also diverging policy
implications from two indicators of health. However, it is hard to identify whether such
a gap is due to a narrower reﬂection of health status in the former, or subjectivity in
the latter. Therefore, further investigation is needed to construct alternative indicators of
global health that are more comparable across heterogeneous groups.
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Appendix
A Distribution of raw self-reported health
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Note: 1 for excellent health, 2 for very good, 3 for good, 4 for fair and 5 for poor health.
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B Summary statistics
Austria Germany Sweden Netherlands Spain
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Grip strength 34.60 (11.50) 35.60 (10.70) 35.20 (11.70) 34.70 (11.20) 28.30 (10.70)
Self-assessed health 67.50 (28.00) 66.70 (27.60) 72.10 (25.30) 73.00 (24.30) 63.70 (30.60)
Age 68.70 (8.32) 67.00 (7.70) 68.70 (8.53) 67.20 (8.53) 69.10 (8.69)
Female 0.59 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50)
Book at age 10: None/few (ref.) 0.42 (0.49) 0.31 (0.46) 0.17 (0.37) 0.30 (0.46) 0.69 (0.46)
: One shelf 0.28 (0.45) 0.25 (0.43) 0.22 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.16 (0.37)
: One bookcase 0.21 (0.40) 0.29 (0.45) 0.34 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.10 (0.30)
: Two bookcases 0.09 (0.29) 0.16 (0.36) 0.26 (0.44) 0.15 (0.36) 0.06 (0.23)
Parent smoked 0.55 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.83 (0.37) 0.62 (0.49)
Parent drank heavily 0.12 (0.32) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27) 0.04 (0.18) 0.08 (0.28)
Childhood residence : City (ref.) 0.21 (0.40) 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.39 (0.49) 0.13 (0.34)
: Town 0.24 (0.43) 0.35 (0.48) 0.46 (0.50) 0.30 (0.46) 0.69 (0.46)
: Rural area 0.55 (0.50) 0.43 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.18 (0.38)
Height decile 5.20 (2.78) 5.14 (2.88) 5.54 (2.88) 5.41 (2.84) 5.21 (2.74)
Education 10.60 (3.93) 14.10 (2.84) 11.10 (3.16) 12.00 (3.25) 6.57 (4.09)
Job at age 35 : Professional 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 0.28 (0.45) 0.18 (0.38) 0.05 (0.21)
: Technician 0.06 (0.24) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 0.09 (0.29) 0.04 (0.20)
: Service/oﬃce clerk 0.26 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46) 0.26 (0.44) 0.18 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30)
: Farmer 0.05 (0.23) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.26)
: Skilled 0.13 (0.33) 0.17 (0.38) 0.11 (0.31) 0.13 (0.34) 0.15 (0.36)
: Unskilled 0.10 (0.29) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.20) 0.18 (0.38)
: Other 0.22 (0.42) 0.19 (0.39) 0.14 (0.35) 0.31 (0.46) 0.23 (0.42)
: Never worked 0.06 (0.23) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 0.04 (0.18) 0.19 (0.39)
Drank at t− 1 : Daily (ref.) 0.17 (0.37) 0.22 (0.42) 0.10 (0.29) 0.34 (0.47) 0.23 (0.42)
: Weekly 0.30 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 0.49 (0.50) 0.31 (0.46) 0.13 (0.33)
: Monthly 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46) 0.14 (0.35) 0.10 (0.31)
: Never 0.25 (0.43) 0.16 (0.37) 0.12 (0.33) 0.20 (0.40) 0.51 (0.50)
Smoked at t− 1 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.19 (0.39) 0.14 (0.35)
Exercised weekly at t− 1 0.84 (0.37) 0.92 (0.27) 0.94 (0.24) 0.91 (0.28) 0.85 (0.36)
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 0.29 (0.45)
N 1088 1655 2361 2479 1839
33
Italy France Denmark Switzerland Belgium
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Grip strength 31.53 (11.31) 32.77 (11.50) 35.70 (12.31) 33.63 (10.63) 34.55 (11.85)
Self-assessed health 67.91 (28.39) 69.87 (26.56) 73.88 (25.12) 80.94 (20.23) 69.30 (27.45)
Age 67.89 (7.77) 67.94 (9.08) 67.42 (9.26) 68.38 (9.04) 67.67 (9.01)
Female 0.55 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50)
Book at age 10: None/few (ref.) 0.76 (0.43) 0.45 (0.50) 0.22 (0.41) 0.30 (0.46) 0.46 (0.50)
: One shelf 0.13 (0.33) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41)
: One bookcase 0.07 (0.26) 0.20 (0.40) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46) 0.20 (0.40)
: Two bookcases 0.04 (0.19) 0.14 (0.34) 0.27 (0.44) 0.21 (0.41) 0.12 (0.33)
Parent smoked 0.62 (0.48) 0.50 (0.50) 0.81 (0.39) 0.55 (0.50) 0.72 (0.45)
Parent drank heavily 0.11 (0.32) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28)
Childhood residence : City (ref.) 0.09 (0.29) 0.21 (0.41) 0.28 (0.45) 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40)
: Town 0.29 (0.45) 0.38 (0.48) 0.25 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 0.27 (0.45)
: Rural area 0.62 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50)
Height decile 5.09 (2.82) 5.48 (2.81) 5.28 (2.87) 5.24 (2.80) 5.29 (2.86)
Education 7.21 (4.14) 9.44 (5.12) 12.60 (3.36) 11.81 (4.20) 10.46 (3.75)
Job at age 35 : Professional 0.05 (0.23) 0.16 (0.36) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35)
: Technician 0.07 (0.26) 0.16 (0.37) 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30)
: Service/oﬃce clerk 0.15 (0.36) 0.22 (0.41) 0.31 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.17 (0.37)
: Farmer 0.08 (0.27) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.17)
: Skilled 0.12 (0.32) 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.35) 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30)
: Unskilled 0.21 (0.41) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 0.04 (0.19) 0.21 (0.41)
: Other 0.17 (0.37) 0.18 (0.39) 0.13 (0.34) 0.24 (0.43) 0.19 (0.39)
: Never worked 0.15 (0.36) 0.04 (0.20) 0.01 (0.08) 0.02 (0.14) 0.06 (0.25)
Drank at t− 1 : Daily (ref.) 0.41 (0.49) 0.38 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.27 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46)
: Weekly 0.09 (0.28) 0.24 (0.43) 0.44 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47)
: Monthly 0.06 (0.24) 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40)
: Never 0.39 (0.49) 0.18 (0.39) 0.06 (0.23) 0.13 (0.34) 0.18 (0.38)
Smoked at t− 1 0.17 (0.37) 0.13 (0.34) 0.23 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.15 (0.35)
Exercised weekly at t− 1 0.78 (0.41) 0.87 (0.34) 0.93 (0.25) 0.90 (0.30) 0.88 (0.32)
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.20 (0.40) 0.15 (0.36) 0.34 (0.47)
N 0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.20
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C Model comparison
(a) Male Grip strength Self-reported health
FE HT ML RE OLS FE HT ML RE OLS
Drink: Weekly (vs. Daily) 0.009 -0.011 0.009 0.182 0.488+ 0.017 -0.192 0.065 -0.259 0.061
(0.193) (0.192) (0.193) (0.168) (0.188) (0.652) (0.643) (0.654) (0.552) (0.574)
: Monthly 0.071 0.038 0.068 0.302 0.792+ 0.004 -0.343 -0.136 -1.236+ -1.675+
(0.262) (0.260) (0.262) (0.224) (0.247) (0.884) (0.871) (0.886) (0.734) (0.752)
: Never 0.052 0.010 0.044 -0.191 -0.392 0.264 -0.179 -0.156 -2.304+ -3.603+
(0.284) (0.281) (0.283) (0.237) (0.250) (0.957) (0.943) (0.958) (0.769) (0.763)
Currently smoking 0.244 0.197 0.252 -0.219 -0.499+ 1.302 0.819 1.708+ -0.738 -1.310+
(0.277) (0.274) (0.276) (0.212) (0.201) (0.934) (0.919) (0.934) (0.676) (0.611)
Exercising weekly 0.139 0.153 0.143 0.841+ 2.452+ 0.599 0.747 0.836 6.082+ 14.994+
(0.220) (0.218) (0.219) (0.204) (0.262) (0.741) (0.731) (0.742) (0.682) (0.798)
High cholesterol 0.088 0.083 0.086 0.187 0.322+ 1.332+ 1.282+ 1.257+ -2.341+ -6.451+
(0.188) (0.186) (0.188) (0.163) (0.181) (0.633) (0.624) (0.634) (0.536) (0.552)
σu 7.442 6.252 6.001 6.001 21.252 19.106 16.513 16.513
σe 4.463 4.461 4.463 4.463 15.051 15.043 15.051 15.051
N 9,760 9,760
Note: + p< 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(b) Female Grip strength Self-reported health
FE HT ML RE OLS FE HT ML RE OLS
Drink: Weekly (vs. Daily) -0.239 -0.251 -0.239 -0.088 0.221 1.022 0.899 1.010 0.302 0.058
(0.163) (0.161) (0.163) (0.140) (0.153) (0.777) (0.767) (0.775) (0.673) (0.730)
: Monthly -0.152 -0.157 -0.152 -0.147 -0.038 0.025 -0.024 0.011 -2.550+ -4.917+
(0.187) (0.184) (0.187) (0.153) (0.158) (0.889) (0.878) (0.888) (0.736) (0.755)
: Never 0.012 0.010 0.012 -0.215 -0.298+ -0.493 -0.524 -0.576 -4.130+ -7.156+
(0.193) (0.191) (0.193) (0.153) (0.154) (0.921) (0.909) (0.919) (0.737) (0.732)
Currently smoking 0.069 0.028 0.071 0.192 0.311+ 1.695 1.278 1.844+ -0.780 -2.176+
(0.230) (0.227) (0.230) (0.164) (0.148) (1.095) (1.079) (1.092) (0.788) (0.704)
Exercising weekly 0.235+ 0.247+ 0.236+ 0.723+ 1.610+ -0.083 0.038 0.043 5.770+ 16.097+
(0.138) (0.137) (0.138) (0.124) (0.150) (0.659) (0.650) (0.657) (0.600) (0.714)
High cholesterol 0.089 0.082 0.087 0.213+ 0.319+ 0.650 0.580 0.430 -1.955+ -5.631+
(0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.112) (0.120) (0.635) (0.626) (0.631) (0.541) (0.571)
σu 5.318 4.514 4.262 4.262 24.824 22.566 19.916 19.916
σe 3.388 3.387 3.388 3.388 16.130 16.122 16.130 16.130
N 11,770 11,770
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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D Direct and indirect standardization under Scenario I-VI
Scenario Illegitimate Legitimate Direct unfairness Fairness gap
I age, childhood, M , ui, eit lifestyle X̂∗itβ + uˆi + eˆit yit − X̂∗itβ (ui = 0, eit = 0)
II age, childhood, ui, eit M , lifestyle X̂∗itβ + uˆi + eˆit yit − X̂∗itβ (ui = 0, eit = 0)
III childhood, ui, eit age, M , lifestyle X̂∗itβ + uˆi + eˆit yit − X̂∗itβ (ui = 0, eit = 0)
IV age, childhood, ui eit, M , lifestyle X̂∗itβ + uˆi (eit = 0) yit − (X̂∗itβ + eˆit) (ui = 0)
V age, childhood, eit ui, M , lifestyle X̂∗itβ + eˆit (ui = 0) yit − (X̂∗itβ + uˆi) (eit = 0)
VI age, childhood ui, eit, M , lifestyle X̂∗itβ(ui = 0, eit = 0) yit − (X̂∗itβ + uˆi + eˆit)
The computation proceeds as follows. Let us consider DU under Scenario I as an example.
First, the observed legitimate factors, lifestyle, are placed with their reference values. In
this study, the most beneﬁcial behavior is considered those references such as drinking
monthly, not smoking, exercising weekly, and not being diagnosed with high cholesterol.
On the other hand, original values remain with respect to other observed characteristics
that are classiﬁed as illegitimate factors. In the case of unobserved illegitimate factors, ui
and eit, we take their predicted values, uˆi and eˆit since their original values are unknown.
Finally, DU is computed by adding these predicted residuals to a linear prediction of the
outcome after converting some observed covariates (eq. 14).
DUScenarioI = y
∗(C,E∗) = X̂∗itβ + uˆi + eˆit (14)
To compute FG under Scenario I, we need to set C at the reference values. First, the
observed illegitimate factors, namely age, childhood condition and M , are replaced with
their reference values. It is assumed that all individuals are 50 years old, have had the
largest number of books and non-smoking/heavily drinking parents, and have lived in a
town during their childhood. Regarding M , residualized height and occupational choices
are replaced with zero, but residualized years of schooling is converted to three. Second,
the unobserved illegitimate terms, ui and eit, are standardized as zero.
FGScenarioI = y(C,E)− y∗(C∗, E) = yit − X̂∗itβ (15)
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E Estimation based on country-speciﬁc samples
(a) Male Austria Germany Sweden Netherlands Spain
Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH
Book at age 10 : One shelf (ref. None/few) 1.76 2.71 -1.10 1.45 2.85* 6.69* 0.84 -2.14 0.89 -2.59
: One bookcase 3.61* 1.80 -1.63 6.51+ 1.30 7.58* 2.86** 1.60 3.26* 6.00
: Two bookcases 1.58 4.10 -0.22 15.63*** 1.49 8.86** 1.31 -8.64** 0.10 -7.13
Parent smoked 0.55 0.14 0.06 -0.76 -1.02 -1.88 -0.80 -5.29+ 1.34 -2.53
Parent drank heavily -1.47 -6.26 -3.41* -2.03 -1.37 -3.14 -2.14 0.31 1.65 2.27
Childhood residence : Town (vs. City) 1.25 4.22 -0.16 -8.85* 1.17 -1.61 2.32** 0.59 1.76 -2.55
: Rural area 0.14 -2.52 1.15 -3.67 1.42 -1.14 4.06*** 0.57 3.91* -3.95
Height decile_residuals 1.10* 0.87 1.49*** -0.28 1.99*** 1.47 1.69*** -0.15 2.43*** 1.54
Education_residuals -0.06 1.10+ -0.22 1.18* -0.21 0.58 0.11 1.19*** 0.24* 0.90*
Job at age 35_residuals -1.69** -0.23 0.19 -0.88 -0.45 -1.12 -0.04 -0.86 -0.66 -0.58
Drank at t− 1 : Weekly (vs. Daily) -0.67 -4.21 0.17 0.12 1.20 -0.02 -0.94+ 0.80 -0.21 -3.61
: Monthly -0.98 0.77 0.00 -1.38 1.75+ -3.81 -1.89* 0.53 -0.17 3.70
: Never -1.50 -3.17 0.91 5.35 2.07 -1.79 0.55 -3.24 -0.75 -1.42
Smoked at t− 1 -1.97 2.07 -3.20** -3.90 0.87 5.22+ 1.68+ 0.35 -0.68 3.58
Exercised weekly at t− 1 0.74 1.87 0.38 -0.88 0.14 0.55 -0.31 -1.16 0.31 -1.54
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 0.95 0.64 0.85 1.28 0.15 1.56 -0.43 0.46 0.14 4.85*
Age -0.54*** -0.61* -0.61*** -1.12*** -0.56*** -0.58*** -0.48*** -0.51*** -0.61*** -1.04***
σu 5.94 20.62 5.09 19.45 6.28 16.55 6.60 17.04 6.28 21.78
σe 4.34 18.21 4.72 16.04 4.65 14.54 3.88 13.67 4.80 17.85
N 444 768 1,064 1,096 836
Note: Constant terms and standard errors are omitted. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(b) Male_continued Italy France Denmark Switzerland Belgium
Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH
Book at age 10 : One shelf (ref. None/few) 2.88* 6.10+ 3.81*** 6.32* 2.56+ 2.76 0.86 -0.47 0.49 -3.20
: One bookcase 0.15 2.24 2.79** 4.34 3.77** 5.24 0.33 7.13* 0.64 -2.91
: Two bookcases 3.76+ 6.97 2.09+ -0.10 2.45+ 7.77* 1.53 4.91 0.15 -2.75
Parent smoked 1.56* -0.33 -0.71 1.12 2.36* 5.05 -0.06 -1.14 0.17 1.13
Parent drank heavily 1.52 -0.11 1.53 -3.94 0.71 -2.19 -1.53 -2.28 -1.19 -11.83***
Childhood residence : Town (vs. City) 2.53+ -1.53 1.07 0.24 -1.09 -1.30 2.08 -1.27 1.46+ 2.20
: Rural area 3.99** 1.92 -0.67 1.82 -1.21 1.37 2.81* -0.80 1.74** -2.29
Height decile_residuals 2.89*** 3.06** 1.77*** 0.84 2.00*** 0.29 1.56*** 1.05 2.13*** 0.87
Education_residuals 0.20* 0.91** 0.07 0.58* -0.13 -0.30 0.16 0.38 -0.06 0.32
Job at age 35_residuals 0.51 0.82 -0.68+ -2.27+ -0.89* -4.46*** -0.71 -3.25** 0.13 -2.18*
Drank at t− 1 : Weekly (vs. Daily) 0.55 -2.77 -0.52 1.95 0.20 -1.14 -0.90 -1.56 0.54 1.18
: Monthly 0.60 -2.66 -0.55 0.92 0.05 -2.86 -0.16 2.85 0.77 0.83
: Never 0.86 0.04 -1.19 4.90 -2.06 -6.05 -1.44 2.51 -0.29 -1.02
Smoked at t− 1 1.05 -1.75 -0.03 5.11+ 0.67 2.64 1.29 0.91 0.61 -4.24+
Exercised weekly at t− 1 -1.13+ 0.12 -0.01 5.16* 1.40* 1.15 0.93 5.04* 0.57 -0.12
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 0.27 2.30 -0.36 -0.58 0.06 1.25 0.47 -0.09 -0.26 0.68
Age -0.55*** -0.90*** -0.65*** -1.29*** -0.37*** -0.36** -0.57*** -0.37** -0.58*** -1.02***
σu 6.59 18.72 6.25 19.26 7.20 18.69 5.25 11.22 5.97 20.68
σe 4.92 15.99 4.25 14.54 3.79 11.78 4.40 12.58 4.32 14.61
N 1,209 968 896 533 1,946
Note: Constant terms and standard errors are omitted. + p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(c) Female Austria Germany Sweden Netherlands Spain
Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH
Book at age 10 : One shelf (ref. None/few) -0.07 2.82 -0.76 5.81 1.51* 5.71 1.18+ 3.67 1.76* 4.45
: One bookcase -1.50 3.96 -0.88 5.12 0.38 4.48 0.67 3.86 2.21* 9.59+
: Two bookcases 1.32 -1.04 1.11 6.06 1.05 5.26 0.01 -2.78 3.09* 11.33+
Parent smoked 0.62 0.92 0.13 -3.45 -0.11 -2.64 0.51 1.14 -0.12 -3.68
Parent drank heavily -0.22 -14.79** -0.95 -4.87 -0.51 -6.04 -0.48 -8.83+ -1.30 -7.05
Childhood residence : Town (vs. City) 0.91 7.70 -1.14 3.41 -0.27 -2.00 0.57 1.88 2.49** 1.30
: Rural area 1.22 4.98 -0.05 7.27+ 0.56 -3.57 0.33 4.68+ 3.47** -2.64
Height decile_residuals 1.47*** 0.33 1.29*** -1.00 1.17*** 0.58 1.30*** -0.14 1.03*** 0.90
Education_residuals 0.07 1.01* -0.06 0.88 -0.02 0.73+ 0.08 0.24 0.12 1.54***
Job at age 35_residuals 0.06 -1.44 -0.49+ 2.15 -0.19 -1.01 0.22 -0.62 0.04 0.29
Drank at t− 1 : Weekly (vs. Daily) 0.15 3.24 -0.33 -2.10 -0.31 -0.28 -0.76+ -2.64 0.07 -0.42
: Monthly 0.14 0.65 -1.21+ -0.53 -0.04 -0.31 -0.37 -4.53 -0.45 4.08
: Never 0.23 3.08 -1.14 -1.12 0.10 -0.72 -0.15 -5.54+ 0.16 0.35
Smoked at t− 1 -1.35 -1.91 0.26 -0.53 -0.19 3.63 -0.11 2.05 2.63* 3.43
Exercised weekly at t− 1 0.05 2.25 0.64 -3.56 0.49 -2.13 0.73+ 4.70* -0.35 -1.75
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 1.40* 0.85 -0.63 3.14 0.10 -1.02 0.12 1.22 -0.42 -1.64
Age -0.34*** -1.04*** -0.31*** -0.98*** -0.35*** -0.64*** -0.31*** -0.62*** -0.27*** -1.00***
σu 4.75 22.11 4.24 23.74 4.43 22.45 4.45 21.45 4.81 23.60
σe 4.13 18.12 3.22 15.97 3.26 14.06 3.07 15.63 4.02 19.88
N 644 887 1,297 1,383 1,003
Note: Constant terms and standard errors are omitted. + p < 0.1 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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(d) Female_continued Italy France Denmark Switzerland Belgium
Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH Grip SRH
Book at age 10 : One shelf (ref. None/few) 1.73** 10.22** 0.77 4.54 0.69 1.88 -1.16 -3.32 0.54 3.24
: One bookcase 1.17 11.69** 0.32 12.68*** 2.53** 8.55* 0.65 3.98 -0.05 -0.49
: Two bookcases 1.44 12.55* 0.16 13.74*** 2.36** 3.78 -0.19 4.38 0.88 2.40
Parent smoked 0.58 -1.34 0.49 -2.44 1.21 -2.39 -0.08 -0.31 0.44 -1.44
Parent drank heavily 0.26 -1.59 0.37 -4.31 1.34 -3.04 -0.88 -7.08+ -1.95** -7.37*
Childhood residence : Town (vs. City) 0.73 10.26* 0.09 -0.78 -0.26 -0.33 0.12 2.54 1.18* 2.76
: Rural area 1.69* 6.76+ 0.10 6.84* 0.68 0.77 1.13 3.18 1.81*** 3.61
Height decile_residuals 1.40*** 1.56 1.48*** 0.51 1.27*** -0.85 1.39*** 0.22 1.40*** 0.13
Education_residuals 0.16* 1.00** 0.19*** 0.41 0.05 1.21** -0.04 0.32 0.06 0.37
Job at age 35_residuals -0.24 -1.21 0.08 -3.26** -0.35 -1.57 -0.03 2.00 -0.17 0.15
Drank at t− 1 : Weekly (vs. Daily) 0.29 3.92 -0.31 0.68 -0.35 0.59 0.80 2.63 -0.97** 2.67
: Monthly 0.61 -4.79+ -0.36 -1.24 -0.08 1.02 1.31* 2.41 -0.91* -0.04
: Never 0.83* 0.23 -0.67 0.33 -0.34 -2.51 0.18 4.18 -0.67 -4.09+
Smoked at t− 1 0.30 -0.21 0.57 1.23 -0.67 3.59 0.09 -1.53 0.10 0.42
Exercised weekly at t− 1 0.96** 1.27 -0.02 -1.62 -0.07 0.37 -0.16 -3.64 0.03 1.12
Had high cholesterol at t− 1 0.59 0.03 -0.74+ 2.34 1.08** 1.35 0.87 -0.55 -0.28 0.18
Age -0.28*** -0.96*** -0.33*** -0.96*** -0.10*** -0.70*** -0.40*** -0.17 -0.37*** -0.94***
σu 4.72 22.84 4.46 22.70 5.23 22.15 3.92 17.07 4.48 23.21
σe 3.61 16.78 3.23 15.57 2.69 13.35 2.94 13.54 3.31 16.45
N 1,471 1,223 989 666 2,207
Note: Constant terms and standard errors are omitted. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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F Inequality of opportunity for health among females
(a) IOp in grip strength
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(b) IOp in self-reported health
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43
G Self-reported health based on pooled vs. separated predic-
tion
(a) Male
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(b) Female
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H Robustness to alternative subjective measure
IOpinitial − IOpalternative(percentage point)
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I Robustness to alternative speciﬁcation
IOpinitial − IOpalternative(percentage point)
(a) Male : grip strength
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(b) Male : self-reported health
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(a) Female : grip strength
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